# A Cognitive Instability Puzzle, Part 2

This is a follow of this previous post, in which I present three unusual cases of belief updating. Read it before you read this.

I find these cases very puzzling, and I don’t have a definite conclusion for any of them. They share some deep similarities. Let’s break all of them down into their basic logical structure:

Joe
Joe initially believes in classical logic and is certain of some other stuff, call it X.
An argument A exists that concludes that X can’t be true if classical logic is true.
If Joe believes classical logic, then he believes A.
If Joe believes intuitionist logic, then he doesn’t believe A.

Karl
Karl initially believes in God and is certain of some other stuff about evil, call it E.
An argument A exists that concludes that God can’t exist if E is true.
If Karl believes in God, then he believes A.
If Karl doesn’t believe in God, then he doesn’t believe A.

Tommy
Tommy initially believes in her brain’s reliability and is certain of some other stuff about her experiences, call it Q.
An argument A exists that concludes that hat her brain can’t be reliable if Q is true.
If Tommy believes in her brain’s reliability, then she believes A.
If Tommy doesn’t believe in her brain’s reliability, then she doesn’t believe A.

First of all, note that all three of these cases are ones in which Bayesian reasoning won’t work. Joe is uncertain about the law of the excluded middle, without which you don’t have probability theory. Karl is uncertain about the meaning of the term ‘evil’, such that the same proposition switches from being truth-apt to being meaningless when he updates his beliefs. Probability theory doesn’t accommodate such variability in its language. And Tommy is entertaining a hypothesis according to which she no longer accepts any deductive or inductive logic, which is inconsistent with Bayesianism in an even more extreme way than Joe.

The more important general theme is that in all three cases, the following two things are true: 1) If an agent believes A, then they also believe an argument that concludes -A. 2) If that agent believes -A, then they don’t believe the argument that concludes -A.

Notice that if an agent initially doesn’t believe A, then they have no problem. They believe -A, and also happen to not believe that specific argument concluding -A, and that’s fine! There’s no instability or self-contradiction there whatsoever. So that’s really not where the issue lies.

The mystery is the following: If the only reason that an agent changed their mind from A to -A is the argument that they no longer buy, then what should they do? Once they’ve adopted the stance that A is false, should they stay there, reasoning that if they accept A they will be led to a contradiction? Or should they jump back to A, reasoning that the initial argument that led them there was flawed?

Said another way, should they evaluate the argument against A from their own standards, or from A’s standards? If they use their own standards, then they are in an unstable position, where they jump back and forth between A and -A. And if they always use A’s standards… well, then we get the conclusion that Tommy should believe herself to be a Boltzmann brain. In addition, if they are asked why they don’t believe A, then they find themselves in the weird position of giving an explanation in terms of an argument that they believe to be false!

I find myself believing that either Joe should be an intuitionist, Karl an atheist, and Tommy a radical skeptic, OR Joe a classical-logician, Karl a theist, and Tommy a reliability-of-brain-believer-in. That is, it seems like there aren’t any significant enough disanalogies between these three cases to warrant concluding one thing in one case and then going the other direction in another.

## 4 thoughts on “A Cognitive Instability Puzzle, Part 2”

1. So, this is the same as the concern at the heart of Plantinga’s EAAN – if you are a naturalist (naïve determinist) then you must accept evolution, but if you accept evolution then you have undermined your basis for knowledge under naturalism?

1. Sure, that sounds like the same argument structure, though I definitely don’t buy the premise that accepting evolution undermines the possibility of knowledge.

2. I agree that with how Tommy’s problem is stated in this post that it seems relatively equivalent Joe’s and Karl’s situations. The thing is I don’t see how a scientist updating their beliefs about the world in a Bayesian way based on their experiences could end up in a situation where they are certain of some beliefs Q and “An argument A exists that concludes that her brain can’t be reliable if Q is true,” unless they’ve got some real wacky priors. This was why I was interpreting something different going on in this case previously.

1. Actually, I think that all you need to end up with that situation is that your candidate theories of physics are all time-reversible (or very nearly so), as well as a max entropy prior over phase space for microstates compatible with macroscopic knowledge.